UIC Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 8

Spring 2003

Mandamus As A Weapon of "Class Warfare" in Sixth Amendment
Jurisprudence: A Case Comment on United States v. Santos, 36 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 733 (2003)
John F. Costello Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
John F. Costello, Jr., Mandamus As A Weapon of "Class Warfare" in Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence: A
Case Comment on United States v. Santos, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 733 (2003)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss3/8
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

COMMENTS
MANDAMUS AS A WEAPON OF "CLASS
WARFARE" IN SIXTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE:
A CASE COMMENT ON UNITED STATES V.
SANTOS
JOHN F. COSTELLO, JR.*

"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."1
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
grants criminal defendants, inter alia, the right to a speedy trial
by a fair and impartial jury, the right to be informed of the charges
brought against them, the right to confront witnesses and the
power to obtain his own witnesses, and the assistance of counsel
These rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment should apply
with equal force to both indigent and wealthy criminal
defendants.3
"J.D. Candidate, 2003. The author wishes to thank his wife, Danielle,
for her
encouragement and understanding throughout the challenges and rewards
that accompany and define the study of law. The author also wishes to thank
the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr. and his staff for the opportunity to learn
from them, work with them, and aspire to what they have achieved and
continue to achieve by their contributions to the law.
1. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.
3. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 556 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LAFAVE] (interpreting Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
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In United States v. Santos,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indulged in the creation of a new
remedy, unsupported by precedent, whereby wealthy criminal
defendants can use the extraordinary writ of mandamus to assure
that they will be represented by their counsel of choice.' This new
remedy has the potential for abuses because a wealthy criminal
defendant may now effectively hold the criminal justice system
hostage by pursuing this intermediate appeal. The availability of
this remedy has the potential to increase the caseloads for federal
courts of appeals and thwart the effective administration of

criminal justice at the district court level.6 The availability of this

extraordinary writ, seemingly at the ready disposal of wealthy
criminal defendants to assure their choice of counsel-a choice not
available to indigent defendants represented by appointed
counsel'-has the effect of perpetuating a type of judicially
sanctioned "class warfare," which Judge Posner indicated that he
was trying to avoid.'
This Comment examines the propriety of using the writ of
mandamus as a remedy when the court deprives a criminal
defendant of their counsel of choice. Part I provides relevant
as holding that no distinction should exist in the Sixth Amendment between
the indigent and the affluent defendant as to the right to a fair trial and the
right to the assistance of counsel).
4. 201 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2000), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, (April 7,
2000). Santos was decided by a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit and
authored by Judge Richard A. Posner. Id.
5. Id. at 960-61.
6. The words of Justice Frankfurter are instructive on this point: "the
delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially
inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law." DiBella
v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
7. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 582 (stating "[tihe indigent defendant has
no right to counsel of his choice even though that attorney is available and his
appointment would not be more costly.., than the appointment of the
attorney that the trial court would otherwise select."); Rhea Kemble Brecher,
Limitations on the Effectiveness of Criminal Defense Counsel: Legitimate
Means or "Chilling Wedges?" The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Counsel,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (1988) (indicating "[wihen an indigent
defendant needs counsel, this counsel is appointed and not selected. The
defendant cannot choose."); Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 87 (1974) (stating "by requiring
an indigent to accept an attorney appointed by the court while allowing the
nonindigent to choose his own attorney, the court draws a sharp distinction
between indigent and nonindigent. No Court has comprehensively discussed
the equal protection ramifications of this distinction.").
8. See Santos, 201 F.3d at 959 (stating "if the fact that [a defendant] might
be able to hire a good lawyer to replace [his counsel of choice] was a good
reason for denying [a] continuance, the right to counsel of one's choice would
be eviscerated for any person with a high salary, which seems to us to take
class warfare too far.").
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background from the Santos decision, as well as a brief
introduction to the issues of counsel of choice under the Sixth
Amendment and the writ of mandamus analyzed herein. Part II
outlines the role of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III traces the development
of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, emphasizing its role and
proper purpose, including its applicability as a remedy for the
denial of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice.
Part IV
examines why mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for the
denial of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice and considers the
effect that proliferation of this remedy will have on the judicial
system. This Comment then concludes that the decision in Santos
is an aberration, unsupported by precedent, and strongly cautions
against its precedential value.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

AN OVERVIEW OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL OF
CHOICE

The Sixth Amendment is of considerable breadth in modern
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Sixth Amendment
guarantees an indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel in
felony prosecutions,9 the right to effective assistance of counsel, °
and the right to self-representation." It also provides to a limited
and uncertain extent (to be analyzed more fully later)" the right
9. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963) (holding

"Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions").
10. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding
that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment).
11. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding
that a criminal defendant has a right to self-representation).
12. Numerous legal scholars have sought to define the exact status of a
criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice. Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld & Sherry
Klintworth, Right to Counsel, 89 GEO. L.J. 1485, 1490-92 (2001), indicate:
Although a defendant has the right to retain an attorney of her choice,
the right is not absolute. A court is entitled to balance the right to
retain or substitute counsel of choice against the interests of judicial
integrity and efficiency. Thus, a court may restrict the defendant's right
to retain an attorney of her choice if the defendant insists on an attorney
she cannot afford, the attorney is not a member of the bar, the attorney
declines to represent the defendant, or the court disqualifies the
defendant's chosen counsel. Similarly, a court may decline to accept a
defendant's waiver of conflict of interest and disqualify his or her
attorney of choice.
See also Brecher, supra note 7, at 1957-58 (finding that "[n]o language in the
[S]ixth [A]mendment refers to the defendant's right to counsel of choice," and
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14
to counsel of choice.

Recognition of a criminal defendant's right to counsel of
choice stems from the seminal decision of Powell v. Alabama."
The concept itself can be seen as rising directly from the words
used by Justice Sutherland: "a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." 6
Powell's counsel of choice language received rote application
in subsequent cases." The cases in the wake of Powell indicate
that the Sixth Amendment's main focus is on assuring the fairness
of an adversarial criminal proceeding, rather than an unfettered
right to counsel of choice.16
In recent years, the Supreme Court has specifically indicated
that a criminal defendant's counsel of choice is not a fundamental
while "[some courts of appeal, however, have found some kind of qualified
right, or limited right, to counsel of choice ...The Supreme Court has said
little on this subject, but what it has said arguably limits the concept of
counsel of choice"); Thomas C. Canfield, The Criminal Defendant's Right to
Retain Counsel Pro Hac Vice, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV. 785, 786-88 (1988) (finding
that a criminal defendant's right to counsel of his choice is one of the rights
granted implicitly by the Sixth Amendment, because the right is personal to
the defendant and one of the most important decision made in a criminal case;
however, recognizing that the right to counsel of choice is qualified and may be
denied entirely).
13. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
14. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,
11 (1983); Wheat v.United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).
15. Powell, 287 at 72.
16. Id. at 53. The Court in Powell, concerned itself with due process
concerns, and found that due process requires that a criminal defendant have
the assistance of counsel, finding the basis for this fundamental right echoed
in the constitutions of the American colonies and the Sixth Amendment's
assistance of counsel language. Id. at 57-65. The Court found the defendants
were not afforded an opportunity to secure counsel prior to trial, and that the
defendants received "pro forma rather than zealous and active," id. at 58,
assistance of counsel, appointed the day of trial. Id. at 57. Thus, the
"defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense."
Id. at 58.
17. See cases cited infra note 18.
18. See, e.g., Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450-53 (1940) (finding that
defendant was adequately represented by counsel, despite denial of motion for
continuance, and therefore defendant was not deprived of his right to
assistance of counsel); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1944) (per curiam)
(reaffirming Powell, and finding "that it is a denial of the accused's
constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with such expedition as
to deprive him of the effective aid and assistance of counsel."); Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954) (reaffirming Powell, and finding that "[regardless
of whether [the defendant] would have been entitled to appointment of
counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified."). See
infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text for fuller analysis and discussion of
these cases.
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right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but rather is a limited
right - a "presumption" 9 - that may be overcome by
considerations of ensuring the fairness of an adversarial criminal
proceeding or the proper functioning of the judicial process."
These considerations include the constraints that a criminal
defendant cannot be represented by an attorney that is not a
member of the bar," an attorney that the defendant cannot
afford," an attorney that declines the proffered employment," or
an attorney that is faced with an actual or potential conflict of
interest, 24 including a scheduling conflict."
B. An Overview of the Writ of Mandamus
Appellate review of district court rulings is generally limited
to final judgments. 6 However, a number of exceptions have been
made to this final judgment rule. The collateral order doctrine is a
well-known exception. 7 In essence, the collateral order doctrine

19. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164. "[Courts] must recognize a presumption of [a
criminal defendant's] counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome
not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious
potential for conflict." Id.
20. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (holding that only a
"myopic insistence on expediousness in the face of a justifiable request" for
continuance violates a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to retain
counsel of choice); Morris, 461 U.S. at 14 (holding that a criminal defendant
has no Sixth Amendment right to have a "meaningful relationship" with
counsel); Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164 (holding that a criminal defendant has no
Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of choice with a conflict of interest);
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989)
(holding that a criminal defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to retain
counsel of choice with assets subject to forfeiture).
See infra text
accompanying notes 79-104 for further analysis and discussion of these cases.
21. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 164.
25. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 584.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2003), provides in pertinent part: "]t]he courts of
appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." "The final judgment rule reflects a determination that, on
balance, postponing an appeal until a final judgment is reached best protects
the interests of the litigants in a fair and accessible process while conserving
judicial resources." LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 1257.
27. The collateral order doctrine can be traced to the decision of Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Court noted
that the final judgment rule should be given a "practical rather than a
technical construction," and thus would encompass certain orders collateral to
the litigation itself. Id. at 546. The Court described these as "that small class
[of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
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allows appeal from an interlocutory order that has the effect of
conclusively determining an issue entirely separate from the
merits of the action and which is effectively unreviewable on
appeal from the final judgment of the action. 8 Another such
exception is the writ of mandamus. 9
The writ of mandamus has been defined as "[a] writ issued by
a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer 3to
0
perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly."
Traditionally, the writ of mandamus was available "only to control
jurisdictional excesses."3' In such situations, a superior court
would issue writ of mandamus either to compel a lower court to
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration
be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. In Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), the Court reiterated its collateral order
doctrine in Cohen, stating that, "[t]o come within the 'small class' of decisions
excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate form the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment."
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (7th ed. 1999).

29. The All Writs Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2001), provides in
pertinent part: "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
One commentator has indicated that mandamus "is potentially a far broader
means of obtaining interlocutory appellate review." Robert S. Berger, The
Mandamus Power of the United States Courts of Appeals: A Complex and
Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 37, 38 (1982).
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999). See also Berger, supra
note 29, at 39 (stating that "mandamus has traditionally been viewed as a
proceeding directly against the judge").
31. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 1269. For an example of the United States
Supreme Court cases which are typically found to exemplify this traditional
view of the writ of mandamus, which may be termed the jurisdictional view,
see, Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (holding that
mandamus is appropriate where a district court fails to recognize a defense to
suit of sovereign immunity); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26
(1943) (holding that the writ of mandamus has been, and should only be used,
in situations where a lower court does not have jurisdiction to hear an action
or has jurisdiction to hear an action but refuses to exercise that jurisdiction);
DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) (holding
that mandamus is an appropriate remedy "when a court has no judicial power
to do what it purports to do - when its action is not mere error but usurpation
of power"); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953)
(holding that "jurisdiction need not run the gauntlet of reversible errors," and
confining the use of mandamus to situations like those in Roche, where lower
court does not have jurisdiction to hear an action or has jurisdiction to hear an
action but refuses to exercise that jurisdiction, and DeBeers, where a lower
court purports to take action where it has no authority to do so by statute or
case law). See discussion infra Part III.A for fuller analysis and discussion of
these cases.
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recognize that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the action it
sought to adjudicate or to compel a lower court to exercise the
jurisdiction that it possessed but refused to exercise."
For
example, the writ of mandamus was an appropriate remedy "when
a district judge ... took some definable

action

he was not

empowered to take-or refused to take some definable action which
under the circumstances was clearly required of him.""
The writ of mandamus was not a substitute for appeal," and
thus, where remedy could be had by appeal after final judgment,
the writ of mandamus was inappropriate. 5 This was so regardless
of the hardship or inconvenience imposed on the party while
awaiting final judgment. Additionally, the writ of mandamus
was said to issue only when the party seeking the writ had shown
that "its right to the writ [was] 'clear and indisputable."'37 The
term, clear and indisputable right, can be interpreted as meaning
that the right sought to be vindicated through the issuance of a
writ of mandamus is either expressly granted by statute or
recognized by precedent, and thus a judge has no discretion
regarding that right. Given this situation, the writ of mandamus
has come to be referred to as an extraordinary writ. 9
Some legal scholars opine that in more recent times, the writ
of mandamus has expanded from the traditional view.
These
32. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (exemplifying the
writ of mandamus as being used to compel lower courts to recognize a lack of
jurisdiction, or to compel lower courts to exercise jurisdiction).
33. Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86
HARV. L. REV. 595, 599 (1973).
34. E.g., Roche, 319 U.S. at 26; Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383.
35. See, e.g., Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 382-83 (stating that if the writ of
mandamus was available where an appeal was also available, "then every
interlocutory order which is wrong might be reviewed under the All Writs
Act"). In such a case, the writ of mandamus would not quite live up to the
term "extraordinary" so often associated with it. Id. at 382.
36. E.g., Roche, 319 U.S. at 30.
37. Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384 (citing United States ex rel. Bernadin v.
Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)).
38. See discussion infra Part III for more thorough analysis and discussion
of the cases upon which this conclusion is based.
39. See Note, supra note 33, at 595-96 (stating "[w]rits of mandamus...
have traditionally been available only in unusual circumstances, sometimes
said to be those where a lower court's action can be called a 'usurpation of
power.' As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary
causes."); see Berger, supra note 29, at 37 (stating that mandamus "is said to
be 'extraordinary"); LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 1269 (describing appellate
review through the writ of mandamus as extraordinary).
40. See Note, supra note 33, at 596 (finding that "the Supreme Court has
gradually, in highly uncertain ways, liberalized the standards governing the
circumstances in which the issuance of mandamus by the federal courts of
appeals is proper").
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scholars indicate that the writ of mandamus has surpassed the
jurisdictional limits set by cases under the traditional view, to
allow appellate courts to exercise both supervisory control" and
advisory control over district courts." Supervisory mandamus is
best understood as an appellate court seeking to control what it
perceives to be consistent abuses or incorrect rulings of a district
court," whereas advisory mandamus is best understood as an
appellate court providing guidance to a district court on a matter
of first impression.
However, a deeper analysis of the cases
dealing with mandamus indicate that it has not expanded from
the traditional view as much as some legal scholars believe.4"
C. A Synopsis of United States v. Santos
At the district court level, Santos was found guilty on one
count of extortion and five counts of mail fraud, arising out of
circumstances surrounding campaign contributions sought from
banks and securities firms that held or invested funds for the City
of Chicago. 6 Santos appealed the district court's ruling, and the
41. Id.
42. See Berger, supra note 29, at 48, 50 (finding that the cases of LaBuy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) and Schlagenhaufv.Holder, 379 U.S.
104 (1964) have "greatly expanded the scope of mandamus by allowing its use
for supervisory and advisory purposes").
43. See LaBuy, 352 U.S. at 259-60 (stating that using the writ of
mandamus was permissible to prevent what the appellate court perceived to
be the too frequent practice of the district court referring cases to special
masters, though the practice was permitted, at the district judge's discretion,
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b)).
44. See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 111 (using the writ of mandamus to
address an issue of first impression, regarding a court's power to order a
mental and physical examination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35).
45. See discussion infra Part III.B, D for fuller analysis upon which this
conclusion is based.
46. United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp.2d 802, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1999), rev'd,
201 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2000). The Treasurer of the City of Chicago, Miriam
Santos, was indicted on a twelve-count indictment for mail fraud, wire fraud
and extortion arising out of her seeking campaign contributions from banks
and securities firms that held or invested funds for the City of Chicago. Id.
Santos was arraigned on February 3, 1999, and the district court set a trial
date for April 14, 1999. Id. At the arraignment, attorneys David Stetler and
his associate Corey Rubenstein represented Santos. Id. at 838. Santos'
attorney Stetler objected to the trial date set, indicating that he was scheduled
to begin another trial on February 15, 1999 that would run into the date set
for Santos' trial. Id. The government responded that Stetler was not lead
counsel in the other case, and the district court overruled Stetler's objection.
Id. The district court, in denying the motion for continuance, reasoned that
the case was not complicated, but rather a single defendant case in which no
novel questions of law or fact would be raised, and the government had
complied with the court's order to turn over all discoverable material at the
pretrial conference. Id. at 840. The court also found that Stetler should have

20031

Mandamus As A Weapon Of "Class Warfare"

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed her conviction."7 The
Seventh Circuit addressed Santos' contentions that the district
court judge made numerous evidentiary errors48 and that she was
deprived of her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
through the district court's denial of a motion for continuance,
which would have permitted Santos to be represented by the
counsel of her choice.49 The Seventh Circuit's decision to reverse
the district court was based on erroneous evidentiary rulings."°
However, before addressing the evidentiary rulings, Judge
Posner addressed Santos' contention that the district court's denial
of her motion for continuance had the effect of denying her right to
the counsel of her choice in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 1

advised Santos of his obligation in the other case, and that Santos had a right
to a speedy trial. Id. at 839. The court also indicated that the public had an
interest in having the case resolved expeditiously, since Santos was in a
position of public trust. Id. at 840. Lastly, the court found that because two
attorneys had filed appearances, one could represent Santos until the other
case was concluded; or Santos could seek other counsel, as she had substantial
means given the fact that the salary received by the Treasurer of the City of
Chicago was $104,000 per year. Id. at 840-41.
On February 10, 1999, Santos filed a formal motion for a continuance,
seeking to delay the trial until July 1999, which the district court denied. Id.
at 839. On February 23, 1999, a new attorney, Chris Gair, moved to file an
appearance on behalf of Santos, which the court granted. Id. at 841. Gair
indicated to the district court that he had no intention of seeking a
continuance, yet on April 13, 1999, the day before trial, a motion for
continuance was made, which the district court denied. Id. The trial
proceeded on April 14, 1999, and the jury returned a verdict on May 3, 1999,
finding Santos guilty on one count of extortion and five counts of mail fraud.
Id. at 807. The district court sentenced Santos to a prison term of forty
months. Id.
47. Santos, 201 F.3d at 966.
48. Id. at 961-66.
49. Id. at 957-61.
50. Id. at 961-65. The following quote may shed light on the reasoning for
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Santos:
It must be remembered in reading evidence cases that the evidence
point is often but a peg to hang a reversal on where the court, for some
articulated or unexpressed reason, feels an injustice has been done.
Predicting reversals or affirmances on errors in evidence is therefore
difficult and the precedential value of most such decisions is weak.
Since almost no trial is completely error free, the process increases
appellate discretion to prevent what the bench may conceive to be a
miscarriage of justice though it may lack such undifferentiated power.
JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS, 86-87 (9th ed.
1997).

51. Santos, 201 F.3d at 957-61. In addressing Santos' contention, Judge
Posner conceded that a criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice is not a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 958. Since a
criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice is not a fundamental right,
Judge Posner described it as "one of constitutional dignity, in being
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Judge Posner could have exercised judicial restraint and
addressed this issue as moot, since the grounds for reversal were
found on evidentiary rulings, but the opinion went further. 2
Judge Posner, while conceding that a criminal defendant's right to
counsel of choice is "not so fundamental as the rights protected by
the rule of automatic reversal,"53 indicated that the writ of
mandamus would be an appropriate remedy where a district court
4
judge abuses his discretion by refusing to grant a continuance."
In analyzing the Santos decision, the role of a criminal
defendant's right to counsel of choice in Sixth Amendment
Furthermore,
jurisprudence must first be considered.
consideration must be given to how the courts have sought to
redress deprivations of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel.
An understanding of the role and purpose of the writ of mandamus
must also be analyzed in order to determine whether this remedy
is appropriate and whether the courts have ever used this remedy
in such a situation.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE IN THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT

The plain meaning of the Sixth Amendment provides a
defendant in a criminal prosecution with the "Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."55 Beyond the plain meaning of those
words, it must be determined to what extent a criminal defendant
represented by the lawyer of [one's] choice." Id. at 959.
52. For Judge Posner's views on judicial restraint, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 304-34 (1996).
53. Santos, 201 F.3d at 960.
54. Id. at 961. In order to reach this new determination that the writ of
mandamus is an appropriate remedy as applied to the denial of a ,criminal
defendant's counsel of choice, Judge Posner engaged in what could be
This was accomplished by
perceived as a move of legal legerdemain.
intimating that a criminal defendant's counsel of choice "resembles a part at
least of the rationale for the first class of 'structural' errors," those where
prejudice to the defendant cannot be proven. Id. at 960. Judge Posner then,
retreating to his earlier concession that a criminal defendant's counsel of
choice was not so fundamental as the structural errors protected by the rule of
automatic reversal, made the leap to indicate that since this right cannot be
effectively remedied by appealing the final judgment, the writ of mandamus is
therefore appropriate. Id. Judge Posner made this conclusion without citing
any authority directly on this point or more specifically explaining why this
remedy would be appropriate.
Exactly what the words of the Sixth
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Amendment were intended to mean is not readily discernible by historical
materials, and here the words of Justice Jackson have never been more true:
"[jiust what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
seen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh." Youngstown
Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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has a right to counsel of choice.
In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court stated: "It is hardly
necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel
of his own choice."56 A thorough analysis of Powell is appropriate
to determine the context in which this often quoted language arose
and its impact on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 7
A. The Counsel of Choice Language in Powell v. Alabama
Interpreted
The defendants in Powell, a group of black male youths, were
charged with the rape of two female white youths. 8 During their
detainment, serious threats of mob violence were made against the
defendants that required the sheriff to enlist aid from the militia
to protect the defendants.59 The defendants were strangers in a
strange and hostile land, as they were "ignorant and illiterate...
[and] residents of other states, where alone members of their
families resided."" The record of the defendants' arraignment,
where they pled not guilty, failed to specifically indicate whether
they had counsel or were given the opportunity to obtain counsel.61
The record at trial did note, however, that no counsel appeared on
behalf of the defendants when the judge attempted to proceed.62
As a result, the court appointed the defendants counsel that same
day.6" Despite having counsel at trial, the defendants were found
56. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
57. The language in Powell has been interpreted by some as the Court's
explicit statement of a constitutional right to counsel of choice. See Canfield,
supra note 12, at 786 (stating that "[a] criminal defendant's right to the
counsel of his choice, explicitly acknowledged in Powell v.Alabama, is one of a
cluster of rights identified as incident to the [S]ixth [Almendment's right to
counsel clause."). However, others have found that no right to counsel of
choice exists, either in the Constitution or the Supreme Court's statement in
Powell. See Brecher, supra note 7, at 1957 (finding that "[n]o language in the
[Slixth [Almendment refers to the defendant's right to counsel of choice.").
58. Powell, 287 U.S. at 49. The case arose out of allegations that a group of
male black youths, including the seven defendants at trial, were on a freight
train in Alabama along with a group of seven male white youths and two
female white youths. Id. at 50. A fight erupted, where all but three of the
white youths, one male and the two females, were thrown from the train. Id.
at 50-51. The youths that were thrown from the train sent message of the
fight to the authorities and the seven defendants were arrested based on
allegations that the two female white youths were raped by six male black
youths. Id. at 51.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 56. After it initially appeared that no counsel had been
appointed, an attorney, not a member of the local bar, indicated to the judge
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guilty and sentenced to death.64
The Supreme Court found that under the hostile conditions in
the community and the "pro forma rather than zealous and
active"65 assistance of counsel, the "defendants were not accorded
the right of counsel in any substantial sense,"66 in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights."
This manner of
appointment effectively denied the defendants any opportunity to
investigate or adequately prepare a defense. 6 The Supreme Court
went on to emphasize the fundamental importance of the
assistance of counsel, stating that "[elven the intelligent and
educated layman have small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law ...[and] [i]f that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect."69
What Powell instructs is simply the fundamental nature of
the assistance of counsel in assuring a fair trial, and not the
constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel of choice. The
Supreme Court's opinion does not grant the right to counsel of
choice, but rather it grants a defendant "a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice."7 °
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice in the Wake of
Powell v. Alabama
Numerous cases in the immediate wake of Powell indicated
the importance of a defendant being accorded the right to a
that he was present on behalf of interested persons to see that defendants
were represented. Id. at 53. A disorganized exchange took place between this

attorney, the judge and members of the local bar. Id. at 53-56. The record
indicated that the judge "had 'appointed all the members of the bar' for the
limited 'purpose of arraigning the defendants,"' but representation for trial
had yet to be determined. Id. at 56. The disorganized exchange coming to
some semblance of an appointment of counsel allowed the trial to continue
that day. Id.

64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Id. The Supreme Court's opinion included a detailed account of the
genesis of the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel, tracing the

constitutions and laws of the American colonies and the Constitution of the
United States. Id. at 60-64. The Court concluded that the circumstances
surrounding the trials of defendants amounted to a violation of the defendants'
due process rights to a fair trial. Id. at 68.
67. It is noteworthy that Powell was not a Sixth Amendment case, but
rather a state prosecution which the Court analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 553.
"Nonetheless, it has had continuing significance in the interpretation of the

Sixth Amendment." Id.
68. Powell, 287 U.S. at 58.
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
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reasonable opportunity to have the assistance of counsel for one's
72
defense.71 In that regard, Chandler v. Fretag
is instructive.
In Chandler, the defendant was indicted for housebreaking
and larceny.73
On the date of trial, defendant intended to
represent himself, believing that "an attorney could do him no
good."74 However, just before the trial began, defendant was
informed that he would also be tried as a habitual criminal, at
which point he requested a continuance to obtain counsel. 75 The
court denied his request and so the defendant proceeded to trial,
entering a plea of guilty to the housebreaking and larceny charges,
while the court entered a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of
being a habitual criminal.7 ' The Supreme Court reversed a denial
of habeas corpus relief and held that "[r]egardless of whether
[defendant] would have been entitled to the appointment of
counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was
unqualified."77
In Chandler, the defendant was completely denied the
opportunity to secure the assistance of counsel in order to defend a
charge presented to defendant on the day of his trial. Again, what
Chandler, and other cases of the period7 instruct is simply the
fundamental nature of the assistance of counsel in assuring a fair
trial, and not the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel
of choice.
The cases concerning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of choice beyond the immediate wake of Powell are also quite
instructive. In Ungar v. Sarafite,9 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the denial of a
continuance deprived defendant of due process in his
"constitutional right to engage counsel and to defend against the
charge." ' The Court found that while the matter of a continuance
71. See cases cited supra note 18 (explaining the theory of reasonable
assistance of counsel).
72. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
73. Chandler,348 U.S. at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. From the Supreme Court opinion it seems that defendant entered a

plea of guilty only as to the housebreaking and robbery charges.

After

defendant entered his plea, the judge then instructed the jury "to raise their
right hands... if they found [defendant] to be an habitual criminal." Id. All
jurors raised their right hands. Id. In state habeas corpus relief proceedings,

there existed some question as to whether defendant had also pled guilty to
the habitual criminal charge. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 9.
78. See cases cited supra note 18 (detailing other cases from the 1940s).
79. 376 U.S. 575 (1964).

80. Id. at 589. The defendant was served with a showcause order charging
that defendant's remarks during another trial, presided at by the judge
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is within the trial judge's discretion, "a myopic insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can
render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.""'
However, in Ungar, the Court found no violation of defendant's
right to due process of law because defendant had adequate notice
of the hearing in which to prepare a defense."2 While Ungar does
not specifically address the right to counsel of choice directly, it is
instructive on the issue because the case, while citing Chandler,"
serves to define the terms of "reasonable opportunity to employ
and consult with counsel." 4 In Ungar, it is clear that the term
"reasonable" is just that. While a court cannot display a "myopic
insistence upon expediousness,"8" by the same logic, a defendant
cannot display a "myopic insistence" upon counsel of choice.
Subsequent cases support the Ungar point of view. The next
Supreme Court case directly addressing the right to counsel of
choice issue was Morris v. Slappy." In Morris, the Supreme Court
addressed whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated where a defendant is denied a motion for
continuance until the attorney initially appointed is available and
instead the defendant is defended by substitute appointed
counsel.87 After exhausting his state appeals, defendant petitioned
issuing the showcause order, amounted to contempt of court. Id. at 581. The
judge denied several motions for a continuance, which resulted in defendant's
attorney being forced to withdraw. Id. The hearing proceeded without counsel
for defendant, himself an attorney, and defendant again sought another
motion for continuance and to hold the hearing before another judge, which
the judge denied and found defendant guilty of contempt. Id. Specifically,
defendant argued that he needed time to "present medical proof and expert
testimony showing no contempt was intended" and that inclement weather in
the days prior to trial prevented his preparation. Id. at 590-91.
81. Id. at 589.
82. Id. at 591.
83. Id. at 589.
84. Chandler,348 U.S. at 10.
85. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589.
86. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
87. Id. at 3. Defendant was charged with five counts including, inter alia,
rape, robbery, and false imprisonment. Id. at 5. Counsel was appointed and a
trial date set, however, six days before trial the attorney appointed to
represent defendant was hospitalized and another attorney was appointed to
represent defendant.
Id. The original attorney had done extensive
investigation, which was reviewed by the substituted attorney, and the
substitute attorney also met with defendant prior to trial. Id. At trial,
defendant addressed the court and made comments regarding a lack of
adequate preparation, which the court construed as a motion for continuance
and denied. Id. at 6. Substitute counsel assured the trial court that he was
prepared for trial. Id. On the second and third day of trial, defendant again
addressed the court and made comments to the effect that the original
attorney appointed to him was his attorney and not the substitute counsel
before the court. Id. at 7-8. The court again construed defendant's comments
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the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court

denied.88 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals directed
that the writ be issued unless defendant received a new trial. 9
The court of appeals recognized that "an indigent defendant does
not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his
own choosing,"9 but found that the defendant was merely seeking
a continuance so that his appointed attorney could represent him. 9'
The court of appeals went on to hold that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would "be without substance if it did not include
the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship."92 The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.93 The Court reiterated the language of Ungar that in the
context of a continuance, "only an unreasoning and arbitrary
'insistence upon expediousness in the face of a justifiable request
for delay' violates the right to assistance of counsel."94 However,
the Court found that the denial of the continuance motion was
reasonable based on the timing of the motions and what could
have been perceived by the trial court as defendant's lack of good
faith in seeking to delay the trial through bringing the motions.95
The Court also rejected the notion that "the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a 'meaningful relationship' between an accused and his
counsel,"96 finding that "the state courts provided [the defendant] a
fair trial and the United States District Judge properly denied
relief."97
Morris, as the first case in the wake of Powell to directly
address the issue of the right to counsel of choice, instructs that
the Sixth Amendment is concerned with assuring a criminal
defendant the right to a fair trial and the assistance of counsel;
beyond that, the Sixth Amendment guarantees no right to counsel
of choice. This emphasis on a fair trial, rather than counsel of

as a renewed motion for continuance and denied the renewed motion. Id. at 8.
At this point, defendant refused to take the stand, against the advice of
counsel. Id. at 9. The jury convicted defendant on three counts, but failed to
reach a verdict on the two remaining counts. Id. A second trial was held a
week later on the two remaining counts which the jury failed to reach a
verdict on, ultimately finding defendant guilty on these two counts. Id.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id. at 11-12 (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 15.
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choice, was reiterated in Wheat v. United States.89
In Wheat, the Court was called on to balance the right to
counsel of choice with the right to conflict-free representation, in
the context of one attorney representing multiple criminal
defendants on related charges of a criminal conspiracy.99 The
Supreme Court began its analysis by reinforcing the fact that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, "'was designed to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process.""" °
The Court
proceeded, reiterating that, "'the appropriate inquiry focuses on
the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his
lawyer as such."' 10 ' Relying on the Morris decision, the Court
clarified the right to counsel of choice issue, stating that:
[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's preferred
attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential
aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each
criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will
inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.'0 '
The Court's holding recognized a "presumption" in favor of a
defendant's counsel of choice, but stated that this "presumption"
could be overcome by either showing an actual or potential
conflict.'03
As the clearest Supreme Court pronouncement on the right to
counsel of choice, Wheat instructs that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair trial and the
right to the assistance of counsel.0 4 The Wheat Court recognized a
presumption of being defended by one's counsel of choice, but that
representation is not a fundamental Sixth Amendment right.'
Thus, in Wheat, the Court clarified that the words "fair
98. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
99. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154-55.
The defendant was charged with
participating in a narcotics distribution conspiracy. Id. at 154. The same

attorney represented two other co-conspirators, the first co-conspirator had
offered to plead guilty while the second co-conspirator had already entered a
guilty plea. Id. at 155. The defendant then sought to be represented by this
same attorney. Id. The government objected, stating that this attorney's
representation of defendant would create a conflict of interest. Id. at 155-56.
The defendant replied that he waived the right to have conflict-free counsel
and asserted his right to have his counsel of choice. Id. at 156. The district
court found that a conflict of interest existed and denied defendant's request to
substitute his attorney. Id. at 157. Defendant proceeded to trial without his
counsel of choice and was convicted. Id.
100. Id. at 158 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
101. Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21
(1984)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 164.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice"" 6 from Powell do
not recognize a fundamental constitutional right to counsel of
choice. 17
C. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Precedent Regarding the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice
Having traced the development of the counsel of choice issue
through Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, reflected in Supreme
Court opinions, it is established that there is no fundamental
constitutional right to a criminal defendant's counsel of choice.'
As required under the principle of stare decisis,"°9 the decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reiterate this position." ° In fact, the position taken by the trial
court in Santos appears contradictory to other Seventh Circuit

106. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
107. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164,
108. See discussion supra Part II. A-B (discussing the right to counsel
located in the Sixth Amendment).
109. The term stare decisis is Latin for "to stand by things decided," and
instructs that "it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions
when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1414 (7th ed. 1999).
110. See United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that an indigent defendant has a right to competent counsel but not a right to
counsel of his choice); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute); United
States v. Combs, 222 F.3d 353, 360-61 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the right
to counsel of choice is not absolute); United States v. Messino, 181 F.3d 826,
831 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant's right to retain counsel of choice
does not extend to an attorney the defendant cannot afford); United States v.
Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the right to counsel of
choice is not absolute); United States v. Vasquez, 966 F.2d 254, 261 (7th Cir.
1992) (recognizing a defendant's right to counsel of choice is not absolute, but
is to be balanced against broader interests of judicial integrity); United States
v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (reaffirming Wheat, 461 U.S. 153
(1988), holding that there is not an absolute right to counsel of choice); United
States v. Rasmussen, 881 F.2d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a
defendant's right to counsel of choice is not absolute, but is to be balanced
against fair and proper administration of justice); United States v. Micke, 859
F.2d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a criminal defendant's right to
retained counsel of choice "is not absolute, but qualified, and must be balanced
against the requirements of the fair and proper administration of justice");
United States ex rel. Kieba v. McGinnis, 796 F.2d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "where the inability of retained counsel to serve gives promise of
unreasonable delay or inconvenience in completing the trial, the court may
require the defendant to secure other counsel"); United States v. O'Malley, 786
F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the right to counsel of choice is not
absolute); Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee an indigent criminal defendant the
appointment of counsel of choice).
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cases, both before and after the Santos decision"' Assuming
arguendo that Santos' limited Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of choice was violated, it must next be determined how the
deprivation of this limited right to counsel of choice is treated by
the courts.

111. Of particular importance is United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669 (7th
Cir. 2001), another decision authored by Judge Posner, where Judge Posner
appears to be perpetuating this "class warfare," which he was so quick to
defend in Santos. See generally Santos, 201 F.3d at 959.
Oreye, an indigent criminal defendant, was appointed counsel. Oreye, 263
F.3d at 670. Oreye became dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and so the
court appointed substitute counsel. Id. Six business days before trial, the
substitute counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that Oreye refused
to cooperate with him. Id. The district court judge gave Oreye a choice
between continuing to be represented by substitute counsel, retaining his own
counsel, or proceeding pro se. Id. Oreye "never said he wanted to proceed pro
se," but he did proceed pro se and substitute counsel was appointed to serve as
standby counsel. Id. Oreye's substitute counsel was quite active in the trial,
having "examined and cross-examined a number of witnesses, participated
actively in the instructions conference, raised issues and objections, and even
gave a closing argument." Id. at 671. Ultimately, Oreye was found guilty on
the charges. Id.
On appeal, Oreye argued that the district court judge failed to adequately
explain the ramifications of proceeding pro se, which prevented Oreye from
making an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Id. Judge Posner's
subsequent ruling seems to emanate from his statement that "[tihe evidence of
[Oreye's] guilt... was overwhelming; a baker's dozen of lawyers could not
have gotten him an acquittal on these counts." Id.
A criminal defendant may waive the right to the assistance of counsel and
proceed pro se, if that waiver is based on an informed choice. See, e.g., Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that an accused has a
constitutional right to self-representation, but that choice must be made
"knowingly and intelligently"). Judge Posner found an informed choice in
Oreye based on the logic that "[i]f you're given several options, and turn down
all but one, you've selected the one you didn't turn down." Oreye, 263 F.3d at
670. Judge Posner then proceeded by assuming that if this was not an
informed waiver, "we would doubt whether there had been a denial of counsel
here, because [substitute counsel], while labeled standby counsel, was
functionally counsel, period." Id. at 672. "If the defendant's counsel provides
all the assistance required by the Sixth Amendment, the fact that he is called
'standby counsel' would not violate the amendment." Id. Judge Posner found
that Oreye "had more representation than criminal defendants are entitled
to," and affirmed the conviction. Id. at 673.
Oreye is seemingly irreconcilable with Santos, without finding a
perpetuation of the "class warfare" Judge Posner was concerned to avoid in
Santos. See generally Santos, 201 F.3d at 959. Santos had competent counsel,
and had access to the issuance of a writ of mandamus on remand; whereas
Oreye had neither full zealous advocacy by appointed counsel or the ability to
have fully uninhibited self-representation, and had his conviction affirmed.
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D. In United States v. Santos the Deprivation of the Criminal
Defendant's Counsel of Choice ConstitutedHarmlessError
It is established that the Sixth Amendment is concerned with
assuring fairness in an adversarial criminal proceeding." 2 This is
best exemplified in the case of United States v. Morrison,"' which
addressed whether a Sixth Amendment violation requires some
showing of actual prejudice to the defendant before relief is
granted."' The Morrison Court began its analysis by stating that
the right to assistance of counsel granted by the Sixth Amendment
is "meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process.
The Court defined those words when it stated:
At the same time and without detracting from the fundamental
importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases, we have
implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving society's interest
in the administration of criminal justice. Cases involving Sixth

112. See discussion supra Parts II.A-C; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
134 (1982) (stating that the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to a fair trial and a competent attorney); Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (stating that "[tihe system assumes that adversarial
testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.");
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment "is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process.");
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (stating that "the core purpose
of the counsel guarantee was to assure '[aissistance' at trial, when the accused
was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor.").
113. 449 U.S. 361 (1981). In Morrison, the defendant was indicted on two
counts of distributing heroin, and retained counsel to represent her. Id. at 362.
Two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), with knowledge that
defendant was represented by counsel, spoke with defendant in order to obtain
her cooperation in a related investigation. Id. The DEA agents "indicated that
[defendant] would gain various benefits if she cooperated but would face a stiff
jail term if she did not," however, defendant did not cooperate and notified her
attorney of the conversation. Id. The DEA agents again approached
defendant, in the absence of counsel, and again defendant refused to
cooperate. Id. at 362-63. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice, alleging that the conduct of the agents had violated
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, though defendant made no allegations
that the conduct of the agents affected her representation. Id. at 363. The
district court denied defendant's motion, and defendant "entered a conditional
plea of guilty to one count of the indictment." Id. On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that
"[defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated...
whether or not any tangible effect upon [defendant's] representation had been
demonstrated." Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the solution
provided by the Court of Appeals is inappropriate where the violation, which
we assume has occurred, has had no adverse impact upon the criminal
proceedings." Id. at 367.
114. Id. at 363-64.
115. Id. at 364.
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Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that
remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests. 116

The Court held that a criminal defendant must be assured
"effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial,"'. r but that a Sixth
Amendment violation that does not deprive a defendant of those
fundamental protections "is no basis for imposing a remedy in that
proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the
defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial."18 Therefore,
"[aibsent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the
trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not
implicated."" 9 The Morrison court also affirmed the fact that
"certain violations of the right to counsel may be disregarded as
120
harmless error."
The harmless error doctrine,"' codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2111122

116. Id.
117. Id. at 365.
118. Id.
119. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (holding that
defendant's allegations that his counsel provided ineffective representation,
because counsel was young and inexperienced in criminal matters, did not
provide a basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence
of a specific showing of actual ineffectiveness). Examples of such challenged
conduct having an effect on the reliability of the trial process include the
complete denial of counsel and where counsel completely fails to "subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 659.
120. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.
121. The genesis of the harmless error doctrine came about in reaction to the
adoption, by American courts, of the Exchequer Rule, which in essence
provided that a trial error regarding "the admission of evidence was presumed
to have caused prejudice and therefore required a new trial." LAFAVE, supra
note 3, at 1278-79. Appellate courts were criticized for granting new trials
based on seemingly insignificant errors, id. at 1279, and were viewed as
"impregnable citadels of technicality." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 759 (1946) (citation omitted). In response, section 269 of the Judicial
Code was adopted by Congress by the Act of February 26, 1919 requiring
federal appellate courts to "'give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.'" LAFAVE,
supra note 3, at 1279. That statute is essentially identical to the modern
codification of the harmless error doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). See infra note 122-23. In Kotteakos, the
Court sought to provide guidance to courts on the proper method of applying
this harmless error analysis, when it stated:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one
cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
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and Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 3
instructs a reviewing court to disregard errors that do not affect
the substantial rights of the litigants.14 Chapman v. California2 resolved the issue of whether the harmless error doctrine is
applicable to constitutional violations." 6 Numerous decisions after
Chapman have affirmed its holding." 7 Chapman held that an
error is harmless if it is determined "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.""8 The standard applied to determine whether an error
is harmless has arguably changed;"' however, the Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement finds an error harmless if it "is
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot
be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from
the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65 (citations omitted).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2001), provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or
writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties."
123. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) provides: "Harmless Error. Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded."
124. See sources cited and accompanying text supra note 121-23 (noting that
courts will only address errors that infringe on substantial rights).
125. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
126. 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CRIMINAL § 855, 326 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT, CRIMINAL].
127. See generally Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (concluding that
omission of element of crime in jury instructions in violation of Sixth
Amendment was subject to harmless error analysis); Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991) (deciding that evidence of coerced confession in violation of
Fifth Amendment was subject to harmless error analysis); Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (noting that denial of defense counsel's right to
cross-examine witness to show bias was subject to harmless error analysis);
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (holding that erroneous jury instruction
was subject to harmless error analysis); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)
(concluding that evidence of pretrial identification made in violation of
defendant's right to counsel was subject to harmless error analysis); Schneble
v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (finding evidence of the confession of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment was subject to
harmless error analysis); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)
(holding that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
subject to harmless error analysis).
128. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
129. See Jason S. Marks, Harmless Constitutional Error: Fundamental
Fairness and Constitutional Integrity, 8 CRIM. JUST. 2, 4 (1993) (arguing that
"successive modifications of the test for harmless error.., have lowered the
degree of certainty to which a reviewing court must be satisfied that an error
was indeed harmless").

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:733

clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty absent the error."'' ° The Supreme
Court's most recent statement of harmless error differentiates
between structural errors, which are not subject to harmless error
analysis, and all other errors, which are subject to harmless error
analysis. 131 Structural errors are those which "deprive defendants
of 'basic protections' without which 'a criminal trial cannot
reasonably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence.., and no criminal punishment may be regarded as
fundamentally fair.""3
It is well established that the harmless error doctrine applies
to constitutional violations; however, "[iin which category other
constitutional violations fall cannot be definitely known until the
Supreme Court has spoken about them."'38 The Supreme Court
indicated that a criminal defendant's right to counsel is subject to
harmless error analysis.3 3 However, the Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed whether the denial of a criminal defendant's
right to counsel of choice is subject to harmless error analysis.
Presumably, the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue
because the answer is apparent that the denial of a criminal
defendant's right to counsel of choice is subject to harmless error
analysis. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that where
"the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial
adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other
[constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to
harmless-error analysis."' 35 If fundamental rights are subject to

the harmless error doctrine, a fortiori, a non-fundamental right
such as counsel of choice is also subject to the harmless error
doctrine. Thus, only the complete denial of a criminal defendant's
right to counsel is not subject to harmless error analysis.'36
130. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.
131. Id. The Neder Court noted that structural errors are found "only in a
very limited class of cases." Id. at 8.
132. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78).
133. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL supra note 126, at 330.
134. E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (finding that
evidence obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel was subject to
harmless error analysis); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972)
(same); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (same); Rushen v. Spain,
464 U.S. 114, 117 (1983) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to counsel

violations can be subject to harmless error analysis, "unless the deprivation,
by its very nature, cannot be harmless," such as the complete denial of right to
counsel in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258
(1988) (deciding that admission of evidence at sentencing in violation
defendant's right to counsel was subject to harmless error analysis).
135. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (citing Rose, 478 U.S. at 579).

136. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997)
(categorizing a total deprivation of the right to counsel as a structural error
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Applying the harmless error analysis to the decision in
Santos, Santos was not completely denied the right to counsel;
rather she had to obtain another lawyer.'37 There was no
allegation that this second retained lawyer was ineffective;138
however, even if this second retained lawyer was ineffective, the
remedy for this would lie under the ineffective assistance of
counsel analysis of Strickland v. Washington139 and not under the
harmless error analysis. Since the defendant in Santos "had
counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a
strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may
have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis."" ' Thus, the
deprivation of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice cannot be
viewed as a structural error, if that defendant is able to obtain
alternative effective representation. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the verdict rendered would have been any different
if Santos had been represented by her counsel of choice.'
Therefore, the denial of defendant's counsel of choice in Santos
constituted harmless error.

not subject to harmless error analysis); Rushen, 464 U.S. at 117 (holding that
Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be subject to harmless error analysis,
"unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot be harmless," such as the
complete denial of right to counsel in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338); Chapman, 386
U.S. at 23-24 n.8 (stating "that there are some constitutional rights so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,"
including Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338 (demonstrating a complete denial of right to
counsel)).
137. See Santos, 201 F.3d at 958 (noting that Santos' original lawyer
withdrew and a lawyer with another firm filed his appearance on her behalf
on February 26, several weeks before the trial commenced on April 14).
138. Id. at 959. Judge Posner specifically indicated:
A more difficult question is the consequence of an improper denial of the
right to counsel of one's own choice in a case in which the defendant is
able to hire a highly competent substitute lawyer as a replacement and
there is no contention - for there is none here - that the defendant
would have had a better chance of winning with her original lawyer.
Id.
139. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in order to obtain reversal on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a "defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient ... [and] that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense").
140. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (citing Rose, 478 U.S. at 579).
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting that there was no
contention that the original lawyer would have obtained a different verdict).
The following quote is instructive on this point: "Reversal for error, regardless
of its effect of the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process
and bestirs the public to ridicule it." ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970).
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E. Summary - The Limited Nature of the Right to Counsel of
Choice
It is established that there is no fundamental guarantee in
the Sixth Amendment ensuring that a criminal defendant will be
represented by the counsel of their choice.'
It is further
concluded that the denial of a criminal defendant's right to counsel
of choice is subject to harmless error analysis.'
It must also be
remembered that a Sixth Amendment violation "should be tailored
to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should
not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests."'" With these
considerations in mind, it must next be determined whether the
writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy where a criminal
defendant is denied their counsel of choice.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Courts and those seeking redress in the courts by the writ of
mandamus 4 ' must understand its proper role and purpose;
otherwise this potentially broad exception'46 could become the
rule-in effect eviscerating the final judgment rule.'47
Upon understanding its proper role and purpose, it must then
be determined whether the writ of mandamus was intended to
provide a remedy, or would be an appropriate remedy, for the
denial of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice.
The All Writs Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1651,14 provides no
answer to the proper role and purpose of the writ of mandamus.
Therefore, in order to determine the proper role and purpose of the
writ of mandamus, as well as its applicability as providing a
remedy for the denial of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice,
one must look to United States Supreme Court precedent.
However, the proper role and purpose of the writ of mandamus

142. See

discussion supra Parts IIA-C (demonstrating that the Sixth

Amendment is concerned with guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to
a fair trial ad to the assistance of counsel).
143. See discussion supra Part II.D (showing that the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel is subject to harmless error analysis). A
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be demonstrated by a
showing of actual prejudice. Id.
144. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) provides in pertinent part: "(a) The Supreme

Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law."
146. See Berger, supra note 29, at 37-38 (describing mandamus as
"potentially a far broader means of obtaining interlocutory appellate review").

147. For a brief explanation of the final judgment rule see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.

148. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
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have been the source of much confusion." 9 In order to clarify this
confusion, careful attention must be paid to the terms that the
Court has used, often interchangeably, and most importantly the
circumstances behind the decisions from which these terms
developed.
A.

The TraditionalView of Mandamus5 '

1. Abuse of JudicialPower Test
In Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,' the defendants filed
pleas in abatement seeking to quash an indictment for want of
jurisdiction based on allegations that the grand jury had been
improperly impaneled.'52
The prosecution responded with a
demurrer to the defendants' pleas and a motion to strike the pleas,
stating that the pleas in abatement were insufficient as a matter
of law, which the district court granted. 5 ' The defendants then
sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals, to reinstate
149. See Berger, supra note 29, at 41 (stating that "[t]he current sources of
the 'standards' for using mandamus petitions, and the basis for much of the
confusion in this area, are the oft-quoted phrases from various Supreme Court
opinions."); John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals
Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 200 (1994)
(indicating that "the courts and Congress have created a patchwork of
exceptions to the final judgment rule" creating much confusion).
150. The writ of mandamus has been historically viewed as an extraordinary
remedy.
It has also been historically viewed that mandamus is not
appropriate "to control the discretion of the court." HALSEY H. MOSES, THE
LAW OF MANDAMUS 54 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1878) (citing Ex Parte
Roberts and Ex Parte Adshead, 6 Pet. Rep. 216, 217 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.)).
Justice Story indicated this in a clearer fashion when he stated "mandamus is
not the appropriate remedy for any orders which may be made in a cause by a
judge in the exercise of his authority; although they may seem to bear harshly
or oppressively upon the party. The remedy in such cases must be sought in
some other form." Id. at 48 (citing Ex Parte Whitney, 13 Pet. Rep. 404, 407-08
(1839)). This last sentence indicates that where appeal after final judgment
can provide the relief requested mandamus is not appropriate. These general
principles have gone largely unchanged and are reiterated in modern cases in
which the writ of mandamus has been sought. See discussion infra parts
III.A-E (discussing United States Supreme Court decisions involving the
proper role and purpose of the writ of mandamus).
151. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
152. Id. at 23. The defendants were indicted by a grand jury with violations
of the Sherman Act, regarding a conspiracy to fix prices. Id. at 22.
Defendants contended that the grand jury had impermissibly sat during more
than one term, and that the investigation resulting in their indictment had
not begun during the first term, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 421. 28
U.S.C. § 421 stated that a district judge may permit a grand jury to sit for
more than one term in order to finish an investigation previously begun but
not finished. Id. at 23 n. 1.
153. Id. at 24.
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the pleas in abatement, which the court of appeals granted and
affirmed upon rehearing en banc."'
The Supreme Court,
155
ultimately reversing the court of appeals grant of mandamus,
addressed whether the writ of mandamus was an appropriate
remedy in this case by "look[ing] to those principles which should
guide judicial discretion in the use of an extraordinary remedy."'
The Court began by tracing the traditional use of the writ of
mandamus as used to "confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its
authority when it is its duty to do so."' The cases cited by the
Court for the above definition of mandamus dealt with situations
where a court decided a matter which it did not have jurisdiction
to decide or where a court failed to exercise its jurisdiction to
decide a case.'58 The Court found that the error alleged in
defendants' pleas to abate the indictment did not affect the
jurisdiction of the district court to hear the case, and thus the case
was properly before that court. 9 The Court went on from this
point to plant the seed from which numerous other cases grew.16°
The Court stated that the decision of the district court, assuming
arguendo that it was erroneous, "involved no abuse of judicial
power," 161 and could be reviewed on appeal. Therefore mandamus
was not an appropriate remedy. 6' Mandamus does not lie where a
154. Id.
155. Id. at 32. The Court reversed the court of appeals issuance of the writ
of mandamus, agreeing with the petitioner's contention that the decision of
the district court judge is reviewable only on appeal. Id. at 25. The Court
found that the district court judge acted within his discretion, and the decision

of the district court judge did not thwart appellate review of that decision. Id.
at 26.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1943)
(holding that mandamus is appropriate where a lower court improperly

exercises its jurisdiction by refusing to recognize a defense to suit of sovereign
immunity).
159. Roche, 319 U.S. at 23. The Court distinguished the case of Ex Parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 (1887), because in that case an indictment had been

amended after it was returned by the grand jury and thus in effect was "no
indictment of the grand jury." Roche, 319 U.S. at 26-27. However, in the
present case, the indictment was that given by the grand jury, with the
contention being that the grand jury had been impaneled for an impermissible

amount of time. Id. at 22-23. The Court found this did not affect the
substance of the indictment itself, and therefore gave the district court the
jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 26.
160. See Berger, supra note 29, at 44 (noting that "[tihe Court has also
provided other terms to use in determining when the district court has acted
in a manner justifying the invocation of the writ of mandamus. One of these
phrases, 'abuse of judicial power,' was presented in Roche.").

161. Roche, 319 U.S. at 27.
162. Id. at 30 (holding "[w]here the appeal statutes establish the conditions

20031

Mandamus As A Weapon Of "Class Warfare"

lower court decision was erroneous, even though proceeding to
final judgment is inconvenient and costly." 3 To hold otherwise, the
Court stated, would "thwart the Congressional policy against
piecemeal appeals in criminal cases."164 However, the Court did
not elucidate how it defined an abuse of judicial power, and how
that term was distinct from a merely erroneous decision.
2.

Usurpation 5 of Power Test

The next case to shed light on the proper role and purpose of
the writ of mandamus was DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United
States.'66 The defendants argued the injunction granted against
them was beyond the power of the district court.6 7 The Court held
a writ of mandamus was an appropriate remedy in that case,
because the district court was "not authorized either by statute or
by the usages of equity"''68 to grant the injunction.'69 The DeBeers
Court opined that writs of mandamus are appropriate "when a
court has no judicial power to do what it purports to do - when its
action is not mere error but usurpation of power - the situation
falls precisely within the allowable use of [the All Writs Act] 170
The opinion in DeBeers shed light on what the Roche Court

of appellate review an appellate court cannot rightly exercise its discretion to
issue a writ whose only effect would be to avoid those conditions and thwart
the Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal cases.").
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)).
165. The definition of the term usurpation is instructive in order to
understand when mandamus will issue, and what prompted the Court to use
this term. The term usurpation is defined as "to use without authority or
right," RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1438 (1999), and as

"It]he unlawful seizure and assumption of another's position, office, or
authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999).

166. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
167. Id. at 216. DeBeers involved an alleged conspiracy to "restrain and
monopolize the commerce of the United States with foreign nations in gem and
industrial diamonds, in violation.., of the Sherman Act... [as well as] the
Wilson Tariff Act. Id. at 215. The government sought equitable relief, and
was granted a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from
"withdrawing... selling, transferring or disposing of any property in the
United States 'until such time as this Court shall have determined the issues
of this case and defendant corporations shall have complied with its orders."'
Id. The government contended that the injunction issued was within the
district court's power based on section 4 of the Sherman Act, which granted
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violation of the Act, and the All Writs Act,
which allowed courts to grant writs necessary to the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 218-19.
168. Id. at 223.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 217. At the time of the decision in DeBeers, the All Writs Act was
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 377.

760
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meant by the term of "abuse of judicial power" by recasting that
concept into the term of "usurpation of power." 7' DeBeers
instructs that mandamus will be available as a remedy where a
court acts manifestly beyond the scope of its power, or jurisdiction,
a power determined by statutory law as well as stare decisis effect
given to case law.172 In DeBeers this was exemplified by the fact
that the district court granted an injunction "not authorized either
by statute or by the usages of equity."'73
3. ClearAbuse of Discretion Test
The next case to expand upon the proper role and purpose 7of4
the writ of mandamus was Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,
which specifically helped to address the terms "abuse of judicial
power" and "usurpation of power," by recasting them into a new
term - "clear abuse of discretion." 7' In Bankers Life, the Court
stated, "jurisdiction need not run the gauntlet of reversible
errors."76 This language indicated that not every erroneous
decision made by a district court is the proper case for the issuance
of the writ of mandamus. Rather, the writ of mandamus "is meant
to be used only in the exceptional case where there is clear abuse
of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power' of the sort held to
77
justify the writ in DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States."
Again in DeBeers, the district court granted an injunction "not
authorized either by statute or by the usages of equity." 71 Thus,
mandamus is to be used to rectify the damage inflicted by the
unprincipled decision of a rogue judge, and not a merely erroneous
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
terms

Id.
Id. at 220-23.
Id. at 223.
346 U.S. 379 (1953).
Id. at 383. See also Berger, supra note 29, at 46 (indicating that the
"abuse of judicial power," "usurpation of power," and "clear abuse of

discretion" are used by courts interchangeably and convey the same meaning).
The issue addressed in Bankers Life, was "whether mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to vacate a severance and transfer order entered by a
district judge on the ground of improper venue." Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 379.

The defendant sought a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, but the
court denied the writ. Id. at 381. The Supreme Court affirmed its decisions in
Roche and DeBeers, while at the same time clarifying those decisions, in light
of the traditional formula for determining whether the remedy of mandamus
was appropriate. Id. at 381-82. This traditional formula was stated in Roche,
where the Court cited its former decision in Ex parte Peru, that "[tihe
traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law

and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority

when it is its duty to do so." Id. at 382.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 383.
178. DeBeers, 325 U.S. at 223.
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ruling or misinterpretation of facts or law.
Of further interest in Bankers Life, is the creation of another
term that has gained increasing importance in subsequent
mandamus cases.'79 The Court noted that a party seeking a writ of
mandamus must "show that its right to issuance of the writ is
'clear and indisputable." 8 ' The "clear and indisputable right"
language serves to highlight the fact that the writ of mandamus
will issue where the right sought to be vindicated is either granted
by statute or recognized by precedent, and thus, a district court
judge has no discretion to do anything but recognize that right.
4. A Synthesis of the Abuse of JudicialPower, Usurpationof
Power, and Clear Abuse of Discretion Tests - A Matter of
Semantics
Roche, DeBeers, and Bankers Life illustrate that the different
terms given do not signify differing tests or standards as to when
mandamus is appropriate. Rather, these varying terms are simply
a matter of semantics."' All of these tests serve to accomplish the
same task, which is to define when mandamus is an appropriate
remedy. Thus, viewing these cases together, it is apparent that
mandamus is appropriate where a judge takes action without
authority to do so, or fails to take action when there is a duty to do
so. This authority, also termed "jurisdiction" in the case law,
comes either from statutory law or precedent. Therefore, under
the traditional view of mandamus, the writ is to be used to rectify
the damage inflicted by the unprincipled decision of a rogue judge,
and not merely an erroneous ruling or misinterpretation of facts or
law. In other words, the action taken by the judge can be said to
179. See Berger, supra note 29, at 46 n.43 (referencing the decisions of Will
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) and Allied Chemicals Corp. v.

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980) as decisions stressing the importance of the
finding of a clear and indisputable right in order for mandamus to issue). For
a fuller discussion of these cases see infra notes 209-15 and accompanying

text.
180. Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384 (citing United States ex rel. Bernardin v.
Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)). Of particular interest is what Berger
indicates is the fact that the "clear and indisputable right" language in
Bankers Life is taken out of context as to its original use in Duell, where the

language was used in the context of the issuance of the writ of mandamus
against an administrative officer. See Berger, supra note 29, at 47. Berger is
skeptical of the applicability of the language, because the Court "simply

transfers this test to the context of mandamus within the judicial system
without even discussing the differences between mandamus as an internal

judicial control and mandamus as employed by the judicial branch against an
officer of the administrative branch." Id.
181. See Berger, supra note 29, at 46 (indicating that the terms "abuse of
judicial power," "usurpation of power," and "clear abuse of discretion" are used
by courts interchangeably and convey the same meaning).
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be manifestly beyond the scope of his power. The language in
Banker's Life indicating that mandamus is appropriate only where
the party seeking mandamus relief has "met the burden of
showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and
indisputable"" 8 reinforces this interpretation, for where a judge
has to exercise discretion it can hardly be said that the right is
clear and indisputable.
B. Supervisory Mandamus
The genesis of what legal scholars have termed supervisory
mandamus is found in the decision of LaBuy v. Howes Leather
Co.." 3 In LaBuy, two consolidated cases were brought before the
Supreme Court.'84 The district court judge in both cases had
referred the cases to a master, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, against the wishes of the parties. 18' The
parties then successfully sought writs of mandamus from the court
of appeals.'86 The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the
writs, finding that while the district court judge had discretion
under Rule 53(b), under the facts of these cases the references
"amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues
involved in the litigation."'87 The Court again reiterated the term
"clear abuse of discretion" when referring to the actions taken by
the district court judge.'88 The Court also again recognized that
"mandamus should be resorted to only in extreme cases," 8 9 but
found such an extreme case because "the Court of Appeals ha[d]
for years admonished the trial judges of the Seventh Circuit that
the practice of making references 'does not commend itself and...
'should seldom be made, and if at all only when unusual

182. Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384 (citing Duell, 172 U.S. at 582).
183. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
184. Id. at 250.
185. Id. at 252-53. The parties objected and filed motions to vacate the
references, which the district court judge denied. Id. at 254.

186. Id. In response to show causes orders from the court of appeals, the
district court judge contended that the references were made because the
cases were very complicated and complex, that they would take considerable
time to try, and that his 'calendar was congested." Id. at 254 (internal
quotations omitted).

187. Id. at 256. In finding that the issuance of the writs of mandamus were
proper the Court gave considerable weight to the fact that the district court
judge's "knowledge of the cases at the time of the references, together with his
long experience in the antitrust field, points to the conclusion that he could
dispose of the litigation with greater dispatch and less effort than anyone
else." Id. at 255-56.
188. Id. at 257.
189. Id. at 257-58.
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circumstances exist."' 190
The Court indicated "that supervisory control of the District
Courts ... is necessary to proper judicial administration in the
federal system."191 The Court cautioned that this supervisory

mandamus power should be used only in extreme cases, such as
those found in LaBuy."'
In reality, the decision in LaBuy was not as radical as some
commentators indicated, 9 ' because the Court merely authorized
the issuance of mandamus to correct a defect where the district
court judge had, on numerous occasions, declined to perform his
duty to hear a case that he had jurisdiction to adjudicate. Thus,
while the district court judge had discretion in determining
whether to refer a case to a master, the all too frequent occurrence
of utilizing this rare procedural tool indicated an abdication of the
mandatory duty to hear cases imposed on that judge by virtue of
his office.
C. Advisory Mandamus
The genesis of advisory mandamus can be found in the
decision of Schlagenhaufv. Holder."' In Schlagenhauf,the district
court granted a petition requiring Schlagenhauf to submit to
physical and mental examinations pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, without any hearing, and despite
the fact that Schlagenhauf contended that his mental and physical
condition were not in controversy and that good cause had not
been shown sufficient to require him to submit to the
examinations.'99 Schlagenhauf sought a writ of mandamus in the
court of appeals seeking to have the order requiring him to submit
190. Id. at 258 (citing In re Irving-Austin Bldg. Corp., 100 F.2d 574, 577 (7th
Cir. 1938)).
191. Id. at 259-60.
192. See id. at 255 (stating "[tihis is not to say that the conclusion we reach
on the facts of this case is intended, or can be used, to authorize the
indiscriminate use of prerogative writs as a means of reviewing interlocutory
orders.").
193. See Note, supra note 33, at 596 (finding that "the Supreme Court has
gradually, in highly uncertain ways, liberalized the standards governing the
circumstances in which the issuance of mandamus by the federal courts of
appeals is proper").
194. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
195. Id. at 107-09. Schlagenhauf involved a suit for personal injuries
arising out of a automobile accident where a passenger bus, driven by
Schlagenhauf, collided with a tractor-trailer. Id. at 106-07. The owner of the
bus cross-claimed against the owners of the tractor and trailer alleging that
the collision was due solely to their negligence. Id. at 107. The owners of the
tractor and trailer responded that the collision was caused solely by the
negligence of Schlagenhauf, in that he was "'not mentally or physically
capable' of driving a bus at the time of the accident." Id.
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to the examinations vacated, but the court of appeals denied
mandamus relief.'96 Certiorari was granted, and the Supreme
Court found that the issuance of the writ was appropriate because,
"the petition was properly before the court on a substantial
allegation of usurpation of power in ordering any examination of a
defendant, an issue of first impression that called for the
construction and application of Rule 35 in a new context." 197 The

Court limited its decision to the unique facts before the Court 9.
and reiterated the traditional views regarding the propriety of
issuing a writ of mandamus, holding that "mandamus is not to be
used when 'the most that could be claimed is that the district
courts have erred in ruling on matters within their jurisdiction.""9 9
This advisory mandamus power is unique from traditional
views of mandamus, in that it seeks to preemptively avoid a split
of authority in lower courts on an issue of first impression.
However, this is an extraordinary situation, and the Supreme
Court has not exercised this advisory mandamus power since
Schlagenhauf.
D. Recent Supreme Court Cases -A Reiterationof the Traditional
View of Mandamus
Subsequent cases reiterate this truly extraordinary nature of
the writ of mandamus. In Will v. United States, °. the Court
196. Id. at 109.
197. Id. at 111.
198. Id. at 112 (stating that "[tihis is not to say, however, that, following the

setting of guidelines in this opinion, any future allegation that the District
Court was in error in applying these guidelines to a particular case makes
mandamus an appropriate remedy.").
199. Id. at 112 (quoting Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956)).
200. 389 U.S. 90 (1967). In Will, the defendant was charged on counts of

criminal tax evasion. Id. at 91.

Defendant filed a motion for a bill of

particulars, specifically requesting:

information concerning any oral statements of the defendant relied upon
by the government to support the charge in the indictment,...
[including] names and addresses of the persons to whom such

statements were made, the times and places at which they were made,
whether the witnesses to the statements were government agents and
whether any transcripts or memoranda of the statements had been
prepared by the witnesses and given to the government.

Id. at 92.
The district court ordered the government to produce the requested
information, but the government refused. Id. The district court indicated that

it would dismiss the indictment unless the order was complied with. Id. at 93.
The government then sought a stay of the proceedings from the court of
appeals, which was granted, and sought a writ of mandamus compelling the
district court judge to vacate the request. Id. The court of appeals initially
denied the writ, finding that the order "[was] not an appealable order, and a
review of it would offend the policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal
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outlined the traditional view of mandamus, as proper "only to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its
duty to do so,"2"' as in only "exceptional circumstances amounting
to a judicial 'usurpation of power"'2 2 and where "the party seeking
mandamus has ... [shown] ... that its right to issuance of the
writ is 'clear and indisputable.'" 03 The Court further stressed the
importance that the case was a criminal prosecution, and
therefore, the "general policy against piecemeal appeals takes on
added weight in criminal cases,"0 ' especially where the party
seeking the writ is the prosecution. 200 The Will court specifically
noted LaBuy and Schlagenhauf, stating that while mandamus
"serves a vital corrective and didactic function"2 0 the writ must be
"reserved for really extraordinary causes."2 7
cases." Id. at 95 n.2. Further, the court of appeals reiterated that mandamus
is used "for the traditional purpose of confining a district court to a lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its proper jurisdiction,"
and that while the order may have been erroneous, "the ruling was within the
court's discretion" and therefore not the proper subject of the issuance of
mandamus. Id. However, on reconsideration the court of appeals granted the
writ of mandamus. Id. at 93. The court of appeals did not explain the reasons
for its reversal of its earlier ruling, except to note that "in the circumstances of
this particular case the court should consider the merits of the ruling of the
district court challenged by the government, rather than to remit the
government to a radical alternative appealable judgment available to the trial
judge upon the government's persistent refusal to comply." Id. at 95 n.3. The
court of appeals appeared to assume that the government would not comply
with the order of the district court and would have allowed a contempt charge
to be brought against it, in order to obtain appellate review. In effect, the
court of appeals sought to expedite the process through mandamus review.
Certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court vacated the issuance of
the writ and remanded to the court of appeals. Id. at 107. The Court found
that "the most that can be claimed on this record is that petitioner may have
erred in ruling on matters within his jurisdiction." Id. at 103-04. Therefore
mandamus was not appropriate, as mandamus "is not to control the decision of
the trial court, but rather merely to confine the lower court to the sphere of its
discretionary power." Id.
Of interest in Will is that counsel for the district court judge was Richard
A. Posner, later the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge who authored the
Santos decision. This fact indicates the difficulty in criticizing a decision of
such a learned legal practitioner, whose background has been inextricably
linked with the development of the law of mandamus in modern times.
201. Id. at 95 (quoting Roche, 319 U.S. at 26).
202. Id. (citing DeBeers, 325 U.S. at 217).
203. Id. at 96 (citing Bankers, 346 U.S. at 384).
204. Id. at 96 (citing DiBella, 369 U.S. at 126).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 107.
207. Id. (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947)). The Court
found LaBuy inapplicable because "[t]here [was] no evidence in the record
concerning [the district court judge's] practice in other cases," therefore, no
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In Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern

°8
District of California,"
the Supreme Court reiterated the
traditional view of mandamus, indicating that it will issue only
upon a showing that "the party seeking issuance of the writ have
[sic.] no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires...
and that he satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to
issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.""°9
Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co." ° reiterated the traditional view
of mandamus specifically stating that mandamus is not
appropriate where the most that can be said is that a district court
committed a mere abuse of discretion. 1' In Allied Chemical Corp.
v. Daiflon, Inc.,"' the Court addressed the issue of whether

need to correct any alleged usurpation of power by the district court judge. Id.
at 105.
Some commentators have expressed the belief that Will v. United States
"has been viewed as restricting the role of supervisory and advisory
mandamus." Berger, supra note 29, at 52 (citing 9 J. MOORE & B. WARD,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.28 (2d ed. 1980)).
208. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
209. Id. at 403 (citations omitted). In Kerr, inmates of a prison filed a class
action suit alleging "substantial constitutional violations in the manner in
which the California Adult Authority carries out its function of determining
the length and conditions of punishment of convicted criminal offenders." Id.
at 396. The prisoners submitted requests for the production of documents. Id.
However, the petitioners objected to the request on the grounds "that the files
were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged, and suggesting that they should
not be required to turn over the files ...without prior [iun camera review by
the District Court to evaluate the claims of privilege." Id. at 398. The
prisoners filed a motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted,
subject to a protective order limiting the persons who may access the
documents. Id. Petitioners then sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of
Appeals, which the court denied, on the grounds that there was no absolute
privilege concerning the requested documents. Id. at 399. Upon certiorari,
the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of mandamus relief on the grounds
that the petitioners had not demonstrated that their right to the issuance of
the writ was clear and indisputable, since the Court of Appeals apparently left
open the opportunity for petitioners to return to the district court and obtain
in camera inspection of the documents to determine if the documents were
privileged. Id. at 404. Thus, the Court of Appeals provided "petitioners an
avenue far short of mandamus to achieve precisely the relief they seek," and
therefore mandamus relief was inappropriate. Id. at 405.
210. 437 U.S. 655 (1978). The Court reversed the mandamus relief granted
by the Court of Appeals, holding that "[a]lthough the District Court's exercise
of its discretion*may be subject to review and modification in a proper
interlocutory appeal, we are convinced that it ought not to be overridden by a
writ of mandamus." Id. at 665.
211. Id. at 666 n.7. The Court indicated that, "[a]lthough in at least one
instance we approved the issuance of the writ [of mandamus] upon a mere
showing of abuse of discretion [in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.], we warned
soon thereafter [in Will v. United States] against the dangers of such a
practice." Id.
212. 449 U.S. 33 (1980) (per curiam).

20031

Mandamus As A Weapon Of "Class Warfare"

mandamus is an appropriate remedy to obtain review of an
interlocutory order of the grant of a new trial."3 The Court
contrasted review by appeal and review by mandamus, and
indicated that "[a]lthough a simple showing of error may suffice to
obtain a reversal on direct appeal, to issue a writ of mandamus
under such circumstances 'would undermine the settled
limitations upon the power of an appellate court to review
interlocutory orders."'214 The Court reiterated the traditional view
of mandamus and stated that in order to obtain relief by
mandamus, a party must prove that there exists no other
adequate means to attain the relief desired and that the party's
right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.215 The
Court, in this per curiam decision, gave guidance to lower courts
when it indicated how extraordinary mandamus relief is by
stating: "In short, our cases have answered the question as to the
availability of mandamus in situations 21such
as this with the
6
refrain: 'What never? Well, hardly ever!'
E.

Summary - A Workable Definition of Mandamus: The Proper
Role and Purpose
What a synthesis of these cases indicates is that relief by the

213. Id. at 34. Allied Chemical involved an antitrust suit, alleging a
conspiracy by petitioners to drive respondent, Daiflon, Inc., out of business. Id.
at 33. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent and
awarded $2.5 million in damages. Id. A motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict was denied, but a motion for a new trial was granted. Id.
Respondent sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to
reinstate the jury verdict. Id. at 34. The court of appeals directed the district
court to restore the jury verdict as to the liability, but directing that a new
trial on damages be had. Id. Petitioners then sought review, and certiorari
was granted. Id.
214. Id. at 35 (quoting Will v. United States, 398 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967)).
215. Id. at 36.
216. Id. One case exemplifying the "hardly ever" situation is Mallard v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). In Mallard, the petitioner
was appointed to represent an in forma pauperis litigant, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d). Mallard,490 U.S. at 299. Mallard, an attorney specializing
in securities and bankruptcy law, filed a motion to withdraw indicating that
he would be violating his ethical obligations since he felt unable to provide
competent representation in a § 1983 case. Id. at 299-300. The district court
denied petitioner's motion, and held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) empowered
federal courts to make compulsory appointments in civil actions. Id. at 300.
Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals, which was
denied. Id. Upon certiorari, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) did not
empower federal courts to make compulsory appointments in civil actions. Id.
at 298. Therefore, mandamus relief was proper because the district court, in
holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) empowered federal courts to make
compulsory appointments in civil actions, acted beyond its jurisdiction and
petitioner had no alternative remedy available to him. Id. at 309.
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writ of mandamus is truly extraordinary. It is established that
relief by mandamus is appropriate only when a court has acted
beyond its jurisdiction or authority, or failed to act where it
possessed jurisdiction or authority. Therefore, the action taken can
be said to have been manifestly beyond the scope of the court's
power. 217 Thus, one must look beyond the potentially misleading
labels of "abuse of judicial power," "usurpation of power," and
"clear abuse of discretion," because mandamus is not appropriate
to control the discretion of lower courts.2 18 "Courts faced with
petitions for the peremptory writs must be careful lest they suffer
themselves to be misled by labels such as 'abuse of discretion' and
'want of power' into interlocutory review of nonappealable orders
on the mere ground that they may be erroneous."" 9 The labels of
"abuse of judicial power," "usurpation of power," and "clear abuse
of discretion" attempt to signify an action beyond the traditional
abuse of discretion standard of review used in other situations of
appellate review. This terminology creates a pitfall into which
those who do not have a full understanding of the proper role and
purpose of mandamus fall.2
It bears repeating that mandamus is appropriate to correct
the unprincipled decision of a rogue judge, acting without
authority or manifestly contrary to that authority granted by
statute or precedent. Mandamus will not issue upon a showing of
mere error.2 1 Mandamus is appropriate only where the right to

217. See discussion supra Parts III.A-D (discussing the standard for granting
a writ of mandamus).
218. See Berger supra note 29, at 80 (noting "[h]owever vague terms such as
,usurpation of power' are, they surely are meant to invoke some type of
standard stricter than that implied by the traditional abuse of discretion
standard."). See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967) (stating
that the purpose of mandamus "isnot to control the decision of the trial court,
but rather merely to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary
power").
219. Will, 389 U.S. at 98 n.6.
220. For an excellent work outlining the proper role and purpose of
mandamus, and a suggestion for making the writ more understandable in
application, see Berger, supra note 29, at 40.
221. See, e.g., DeBeers, 325 U.S. at 217 (holding that "when a court has no
judicial power to do what it purports to do-when its action is not mere error
but usurpation of power-the situation falls precisely within the allowable use
of [the All Writs Act]"); Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 112 (holding that
"mandamus is not to be used when 'the most that could be claimed is that the
district courts have erred in ruling on matters within their jurisdiction'"
(citing Parr, 351 U.S. at 520); Will, 437 U.S. at 666 (stating that "[a]lthough
the District Court's exercise of its discretion may be subject to review and
modification in a proper interlocutory appeal, we are convinced that it ought
not to be overridden by a writ of mandamus" (citation omitted)); Allied
Chemical, 449 U.S. at 35 (per curiam) (holding that "[a]lthough a simple
showing of error may suffice to obtain a reversal on direct appeal, to issue a
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the relief sought is clear and indisputable,222 which in essence
means that the judge adjudicating the case in effect has no
discretion and can rule only one way."'
Next, mandamus is appropriate only where relief sought
cannot be obtained on appeal. 24 Thus, where the relief sought can
be obtained on appeal, mandamus is inappropriate. This is true
regardless of the inconvenience and cost imposed by awaiting final
judgment on the party seeking relief.225
F. Mandamus as a Remedy for Deprivationof the Right to
Counsel of Choice
2 the Supreme
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord"
writ of mandamus under such circumstances 'would undermine the settled
limitations upon the power of an appellate court to review interlocutory
orders'" (citing Will v. United States, 398 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967)).
222. See Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384 (citing United States ex rel. Bernadin
v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)).
223. See Allied Chemical, 449 U.S. at 36 (per curiam) (holding that "[wihere
a matter is committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to a
particular result is 'clear and indisputable.'")
224. The following quote explains why mandamus is appropriate only where
relief sought cannot be obtained on appeal:
Apart from the fundamental fear that the extraordinary writs might
develop into a method of review that routinely circumvents the final
judgment rule, the rule that writs may not be used to substitute for
appeal is at times rested on another ground as well. It has been said
that the writs, although legal remedies, are controlled by the equitable
principle that an alternative adequate remedy is to be preferred.
Appeal, when available, is an adequate remedy to be preferred to a writ.
16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §
3932.1 509 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. See, e.g., Roche, 319 U.S. at 30
(finding that "[wihere the appeal statutes establish the conditions of appellate
review, an appellate court cannot rightly exercise its discretion to issue a writ
whose only effect would be to avoid those conditions and thwart the
Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal cases."); Bankers
Life, 346 U.S. at 383 (finding that "it is established that the extraordinary
writs cannot be used as substitutes for appeals").
225. Roche, 319 U.S. at 30.
226. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In Firestone, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a party may appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an order denying a
motion to disqualify opposing counsel for a conflict of interest in a civil case.
Id. at 369. The Court held that orders denying motions to disqualify counsel
are not appealable final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. The Court
based its reasoning on the fact that such an order did not "conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 375 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). In Firestone, the petitioner was unable to
demonstrate that the order was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment, because "[tihe propriety of the district court's denial of a
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Court held that the denial of a pretrial motion to disqualify
counsel in a civil case is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as
a collateral order.2 7 However, the Court intimated that, "in the
exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of
mandamus.., might be available" to obtain review of an order
denying a motion to disqualify counsel. 228 Firestone was a civil
matter, and therefore left unresolved the question of whether the
denial of a pretrial motion to disqualify counsel in a criminal case
was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a collateral order, or
whether mandamus might be available as an appropriate remedy.
In Flanagan v. United States,229 the Court held that a
disqualification order in a criminal matter is not immediately
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a collateral order,2 ° thereby
adopting the holding of Firestone as applied to criminal matters.
However, the Court did not address the mandamus issue. Instead,
the Court stressed the importance of the final judgment rule in
criminal matters, 2 1 and stated that:

disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the
underlying litigation may be evaluated." Id. at 377. Therefore, the collateral
order exception was inapplicable. Id. at 376.
227. Id. at 379.
228. Id. at 378 n.13.
229. 465 U.S. 259 (1984). In Flanagan, four police officers were charged
with civil rights violations arising out of alleged unlawful arrests and police
brutality claims. Id. at 261. The four police officers jointly retained one law
firm to represent them. Id. The three other police officers sought to sever
their case from Flanagan, because the evidence against Flanagan was
substantial and could have prejudiced their defenses. Id. The government
sought to disqualify the firm from representing all four police officers. Id. The
district court judge found that no actual conflict existed, but the potential for
conflict was substantial, and therefore disqualified the law firm based on the
ruling that it was authorized to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 44(c). Id. at 262. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. The court of
appeals did not inquire into its jurisdiction, and "noted that it had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the disqualification order was appealable prior
to trial as a collateral order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Indust.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)." Id. Certiorari was granted, and the parties
briefed and argued both the merits and the jurisdiction issues. Id. at 263.
230. Id. at 270. In reaching the holding that a disqualification order in a
criminal matter is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a
collateral order, the Court reasoned that if a criminal defendant's right to
counsel of choice is analogous to the right to self-representation, and no
prejudice is required in order to obtain reversal, then it is reviewable on
appeal. Id. at 267-68. If however, a criminal defendant's right to counsel of
choice requires a showing of prejudice to the defendant, a disqualification
order does not resolve an issue completely separate from the merits of the
action. Id. at 268. In either situation, an order disqualifying counsel fails to
meet a requisite condition of the collateral order exception to the final
judgment rule.
231. ' Id. at 270.
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Nothing about a disqualification order distinguishes it from the run
of pretrial judicial decisions that affect the rights of criminal
defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for
review .... The exceptions to the final judgment rule in criminal

cases are rare. An order disqualifying counsel is not one.

232

This sweeping statement seems to resolve the issue of
whether relief by mandamus is an appropriate remedy. As applied
to a disqualification order in a criminal case, the answer is a
In fact, no case has ever found that the
resounding no.
extraordinary writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for the
deprivation of a criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice. 33
VI. THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. SANTOS MISAPPLIED

MANDAMUS AS A REMEDY TO REDRESS THE DEPRIVATION OF A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL OF CHOICE
A. Firmly EstablishedPrecedentMilitatesAgainst the Use of
Mandamus as a Remedy to Redress the Deprivationof a Criminal
Defendant's Counsel of Choice in United States v. Santos
Mandamus relief is best understood by resort to visual
terminology, in what can be called the bell curve theory of
mandamus.3 4 Under this bell curve theory of mandamus, the
232. Id.
233. Only a handful of cases have specifically addressed the applicability of
mandamus to obtain relief for the deprivation of a criminal defendant's right
to counsel of choice. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 182 F.3d 668,
671 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to
redress deprivation of criminal defendant's counsel of choice during grand jury
investigation because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
until the defendant becomes "the accused" as opposed to merely the target of
an investigation); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1986)
(indicating that mandamus relief sought prior to appeal, but after final
judgment, was not an appropriate remedy to redress deprivation of criminal
defendant's counsel of choice; erroneous pretrial order disqualifying
defendant's counsel of choice remedied on appeal after final judgment); United
States v. Panzardi-Alvarez, 678 F.Supp. 353, 356, 358 (D. P.R. 1988) (denying
habeas corpus relief and referencing earlier unpublished court order, In re
Jose E. Panzardi-Alvarez, 782 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1985), denying mandamus
relief for deprivation of criminal defendant's counsel of choice because no
extraordinary circumstances shown to warrant issuance of mandamus);
United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to redress a disqualification order
resulting in denial of criminal defendant's counsel of choice because the
requested relief could possibly be obtained on appeal after final judgment).
234. The bell curve is "a frequency distribution in statistics that resembles
the outline of a bell when plotted on a graph." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 122 (1999). The bell curve is a visual representation of
a frequency distribution of a given grouping of data into what are termed
confidence intervals. "A confidence interval is a range of numbers believed to
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terminology used in case law to refer to mandamus as an
extraordinary remedy23
is given graphical representation.
Imagining the theory of mandamus as represented on a bell curve,
mandamus is appropriate to control decisions that lie at the outer
most points on the bell curve, or those rare cases where the
decision of the lower court can be termed an "abuse of judicial
power, 2 6 "usurpation of power,"237 or "clear abuse of discretion."238
Returning to the Santos decision, it must be explained why
Judge Posner's intimation, that mandamus would be an
appropriate remedy where a district court judge abuses his
discretion by refusing to grant a continuance,"' is erroneous.
First, an erroneous ruling, amounting to an abuse of discretion,
resulting in the denial of a criminal defendant's right to counsel of
choice can be remedied on appeal. In ruling on a motion for
continuance, "a myopic insistence upon expediousness in the face
of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend
with counsel an empty formality." 4 ° Thus, where it can be shown
that a district court judge displayed "a myopic insistence upon
expediousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay,"24' a
criminal defendant can obtain a reversal. Even if it cannot be said
include an unknown population parameter." AMIR D. ACZEL, COMPLETE
BUSINESS STATISTICS 232 (Irwin, McGraw - Hill 4th ed. 1999). From the

center of the bell curve, extending outward to near the end of the bell curve is
what is termed the ninety five percent confidence interval, where ninety five
percent of this range of a given grouping of data will be located. The range of
a given grouping of data which fall outside of the ninety five percent

confidence interval account for the remaining five percent of this range of a
given grouping of data. This five percent of the range of a given grouping of

data are termed the outliers.
As used under this bell curve theory of mandamus, mandamus is
appropriate in situations that fall within the five percent of this range of
numbers, or the outliers. This corresponds with the language used in
mandamus jurisprudence indicating that mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (stating that

review based on a writ of mandamus is reserved for extraordinary
circumstances). This gives graphical representation to the language in Allied
Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980) (per curiam), where the

Court gave guidance to the courts when it indicated how extraordinary
mandamus relief is, by stating: "In short, our cases have answered the
question as to the availability of mandamus in situations such as this with the
refrain: 'What never? Well, hardly ever!'" Id. at 36.
235. See cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (standing for the

proposition that review based on a writ of mandamus is rare and reserved for
extraordinary circumstances).
236. Roche, 319 U.S. at 27.
237. DeBeers, 325 U.S. at 217.

238. Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383.
239. Santos, 201 F.3d at 960-61.
240. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589.

241. Id.
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that a district court judge has shown a "myopic insistence upon
expediousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay" 24 and
the criminal defendant must procure alternative representation, if
the defendant's subsequent attorney fails to provide effective
representation, a reversal could be obtained. 43 Thus, the denial of
a criminal defendant's counsel of choice can be remedied on appeal
after final judgment.
Second, the denial of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
is likely to be viewed as harmless error. " Since the denial of
counsel of choice is likely to be viewed as harmless error,
mandamus is not appropriate because this right cannot be argued
to be "clear and indisputable." 45 Judge Posner argues that this is
precisely the reason why mandamus is appropriate.2 6 Essentially,
the argument states that since the denial of a criminal defendant's
counsel of choice will not likely be redressed on appeal, the
defendant should have access to the extraordinary writ of
mandamus.
However, this argument overlooks the proper role and
purpose of mandamus, and unknowingly finds itself in the
pitfall. 47 In seeking to provide redress for Santos, Judge Posner
leapt too quickly to this conclusion, disregarding the basic tenet of
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that "[c]ases involving Sixth
Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that
remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests."2 48 There is no absolute right to a criminal
defendant's counsel of choice. 29 The Sixth Amendment at its core
is concerned with assuring fairness in the adversarial process, not

242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that in order to obtain
reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show
that two elements have been met: 1) that "counsel's performance was
deficient" and 2) that the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense.").

244. See discussion supra Part II.D (concluding that denial of a criminal
defendant's counsel of choice would likely be viewed as harmless error where
the defendant can obtain alternative competent representation).
245. See, e.g., Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384 (citing Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582
(1899)); see also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 408 (1998) (stating that "[oln appeal in

mandamus proceedings, the appellate court will disregard harmless errors.").
246. Santos, 201 F.3d at 960 (holding that "mandamus is an available
remedy when an abuse of discretion by the trial judge cannot be effectively
remedied by appealing the final decision").
247. See discussion supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the
need for careful analysis of the terminology used in mandamus cases).
248. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
249. See discussion supra Part II (discussing how courts have interpreted

the Sixth Amendment to insure a defendant's right to a fair trial and
assistance of counsel).

774
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favoring one side.25 ° The trial received by Santos complied with
this assurance. 5' Thus, the denial of a criminal defendant's
counsel of choice cannot be said to infringe on a clear and
indisputable right, as there is no clear and indisputable right for a
criminal defendant to representation by their counsel of choice.
Third, even assuming that the district court judge's ruling,
denying the motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion, it
does not justify invoking the writ of mandamus. "Courts faced
with petitions for the peremptory writs must be careful lest they
suffer themselves to be misled by labels such as 'abuse of
discretion' and 'want of power' into interlocutory review of
nonappealable orders on the mere ground that they may be
erroneous." 2 2 Mandamus relief would only have been appropriate
in Santos if the district court judge acted manifestly beyond his
authority. In ruling on a motion for continuance, a district court
judge exercises wide discretion. 53 It cannot be plausibly argued
that the decision of the district court judge was manifestly beyond
his authority to the degree required to invoke the issue of a writ of
mandamus. 54
250. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (analyzing a defendant's
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and assistance of counsel).
251. See Santos, 201 F.3d at 959 (noting Judge Posner's specific indication to
the question of right of counsel).
252. Will, 389 U.S. at 98 n.6.
253. See, e.g., Morris, 461 U.S. at 11 (stating that "broad discretion must be
granted trial courts on matters of continuances").
The Morris court
specifically indicated:
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling
trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the
witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and
this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling
reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on
matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary 'insistence
upon expediousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay' violates
the right to the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11-12 (citing Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589).
254. See Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 839-41 (finding various reasons for
denying Santos' motion for continuance). First, the district court judge found
that the case was not complicated. Id. at 839. The case involved a single
defendant, did not raise "any novel issues of law or fact," and in addition, the
government complied with the district court's order to release all discoverable
material to the defense. Id. at 840. Second, the court found that the date set
was "consistent with the Speedy Trial Act," which requires trials to commence
"within seventy days of arraignment." Id. at 839-41. Third, the district court
judge stated that "[tihe Court's agenda must control the setting of the trial
date, not the agenda of busy lawyers." Id. at 839. The district court found
that Santos was represented by two lawyers, and that one could handle the
case until both were able to do so. Id. at 841. If Santos was not satisfied with
this option, she could obtain alternative representation, as the district court
judge noted that "[iut is public knowledge that the occupant of the office [of the
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Lastly, another reason against allowing mandamus as a
remedy to redress the deprivation of a criminal defendant's
counsel of choice is that the issue might be mooted by allowing the

Treasurer of the City of Chicago] earns $104,000 a year." Id. at 840-41.
Lastly, the district court judge noted that because Santos occupied a position
of public trust, "there is a substantial public interest in this case to move it to
a conclusion on the merits ...[and] [t]he public has a tremendous issue in
knowing whether the government can prove these allegations beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 840.
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, found
that the reasons for denying the continuance "do not hold water." Santos, 201
F.3d at 959. First, Judge Posner noted that "[tihe appearance by an
inexperienced associate of [Santos' counsel of choice] was an irrelevancy." Id.
Second, Judge Posner noted that it was the defendant's personal right to a
speedy trial, and that the Speedy Trial Act "is intended to assure not that
federal criminal trials start in 70 days ... but that the unexcused delay in
bringing a case to trial not exceed that period." Id. Furthermore, there was
no suggestion that Santos engaged her counsel of choice for the purpose of
delaying the trial, and that "[ilf the fact that [Santos] might be able to hire a
good lawyer to replace [her counsel of choice] was a good reason for denying
the continuance, the right to counsel of one's choice would be eviscerated for
any person with a high salary, which seems to us to take class warfare too
far." Id. Lastly, Judge Posner noted that "[wie are also perplexed by the
district judge's belief that it is the duty of a federal judge to rush public
officials to trial lest they continue to abuse their office." Id.
Based on the court of appeals' reasoning, it cannot be argued that the
district court judge acted manifestly beyond his authority, so as to warrant
mandamus relief. As regards the reasoning of the court of appeals, "[wlith all
due respect, they do not hold water." Id. First, "the appearance by an
inexperienced associate" of Santos' counsel of choice was not an irrelevancy.
Id. As an admitted member of the bar, this associate presumably would have
been capable of effectively representing Santos. There is no evidence in the
record that this associate felt that he would not be able to provide competent
representation and assure Santos a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.' Here, Judge Posner seems to be fixated on the label associate.
Cf. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 673 (finding that the court is "disinclined to fixate on
the label 'standby counsel' and reverse a judgment that not only was amply
supported by the evidence and... capped a trial in which the defendant who
complains about denial of counsel had more representation than criminal
defendants are entitled to."). Furthermore, contrasting the reasoning in
Santos with the reasoning in Oreye seems to lead the conclusion that Judge
Posner did in fact "take class warfare too far." Santos, 201 F.3d at 959.
Second, as Santos was in a position of public trust, there was in fact a strong
public interest in this case. Thus, the right to a speedy trial was not solely
personal to Santos. The following quote is instructive on this point:
[W]hen a crime is committed against a community, the community has a
strong collective psychological and moral interest in swiftly bringing the
person responsible to justice. Prompt acquittal of a person wrongly
accused, which forces prosecutorial investigation to continue, is as
important as prompt conviction and sentence of a person rightly
accused. Crime inflicts a wound on the community, and that wound
may not begin to heal until criminal proceedings have come to an end.
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984).
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trial court proceeding to advance uninterrupted. A criminal
defendant might be denied his counsel of choice and proceed to
trial with alternative representation, only to be found not guilty,
thus rendering
the issue of the deprivation of counsel of choice
55
moot.
In short, Judge Posner misinterpreted established United
States Supreme Court precedent concerning the criteria required
for a writ of mandamus to be issued. His honor neglected
established precedent indicating that mandamus is not as a
substitute for appeal, that mandamus is not to remedy a merely
erroneous decision of a lower court, and that the right sought to
remedied by issuance of a writ of mandamus must be clear and
indisputable.256
B. Policy ConsiderationsMilitate Against the Use of Mandamus
as a Remedy to Redress the Deprivationof a CriminalDefendant's
Counsel of Choice
Arguably, there is a caseload crisis in the federal courts of
appeal.2 7 The caseloads of the courts of appeal have increased
dramatically in recent years. 58 In addition, the composition of
cases has also changed, with an increasing percentage of federal
court of appeals cases involving criminal matters.2 59 This is an

255. Cf. Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for
Disqualificationof Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 458
n.39 (1978) (stating that "[ilf, after [a] disqualification [of counsel], the party
wins the case, the disqualification becomes moot despite the cost that
disqualification imposed on that party").
256. See discussion supra Part III (discussing mandamus as the remedy for
extraordinary cases).
257. See Michael C. Gizzi, Examining the Crisis of Volume in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 96, 96 (1993) (finding that
"[h]owever people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny
that its appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them
from the institutions they were even a generation ago."). But see RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 85 (Harvard Univ. Press

1996) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL COURTS] (concluding that "[there are serious
problems ... but there is no crisis").

258. See THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 257, at 59 (discussing that "[tihe
increase in cases filed in the district courts, however dramatic, was dwarfed by
the increase in cases filed in the courts of appeals - from 3,765 in 1960 ...to
29, 580 in 1983 - an increase of 686 percent .... ).

259. Id. at 59-62 (indicating that criminal appeals in the federal courts of
appeal have increased "tenfold" from 1960 to 1983). In 1983, the number of
criminal appeals in the federal courts of appeal were 4,790. Id. at 64 table 3.2.
In 1995, the latest year for which statistics were available prior to the
publishing of his book, the number of criminal appeals in the federal courts of
appeal were 10,171. Id. In 2000, the number of criminal appeals in the
federal courts of appeal were 10,707. United States Court of Appeals Judicial Caseload Profile,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-

20031

Mandamus As A Weapon Of "Class Warfare"

alarming trend, since "[c]riminal cases, while fewer in number
than civil cases, are generally more time consuming for the
courts." 6 ' Given this alarming trend, it would seem that opening
access to the federal courts of appeal prior to final judgment, by
way of liberalizing issuance of writs of mandamus would only
exacerbate the problem.26 '
Any judicial acceptance of this new and incorrectly applied
remedy has the potential for abuses because a wealthy criminal
defendant would be able to effectively hold the criminal justice
system hostage by pursuing this intermediate appeal. Justice
Frankfurter warned the bench and bar of just such a problem
almost half a century ago, when he indicated "the delays and
disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially
inimical
to the effective and fair administration of the criminal
262
law."

V.

CONCLUSION

It must not be forgotten that what is sought in every criminal
proceeding is a fair trial, 6 3 for both the accused and the
prosecution, as representative of our system of laws and the public
whose voices are represented therein. The remedy espoused by
Judge Posner in United States v. Santos, intimating that
mandamus relief is appropriate to remedy the deprivation of a
criminal defendant's counsel of choice, tips the balance of this
fairness in favor of a wealthy criminal defendant,'64 in effect

bin/csma2000.pl (last visited April 28, 2003). From 1983 through 2000, the

number of criminal appeals filed in the federal courts of appeals have
increased approximately forty-five percent.
260. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA
57 (4th ed. 1998).
261. Cf Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of California, 426 U.S. 394, 403
(1976) (holding that "[a] judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in
anything less than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of
defeating the very policies sought to be furthered by that judgment of
Congress," reflected in the final judgment rule.)
262. DiBella, 369 U.S. at 126 (1962).
263. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 671-73.
264. The following quote of Judge Learned Hand highlights the problem:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While

the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment
on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt
in the minds of any one of the twelve .... Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery
sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL supra note 126, at § 853, 298 (citing United States v
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perpetuating a type of judicially-sanctioned "class warfare," which
Judge Posner indicated that he was trying to avoid." 5 Judge
Posner's intimation that mandamus is an appropriate remedy to
redress the deprivation of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice
is unsupported by precedent, and a misapplication of the theory of
mandamus. The decision in United States v. Santos, indicating
that mandamus would be an appropriate remedy for the
deprivation of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice, should not
be followed.

Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)).
265. Santos, 201 F.3d at 959. See Tague, supra note 7, at 87 (indicating that
no court has "comprehensively discussed the equal protection ramifications" of
the distinction drawn in the law between indigent and nonindigent criminal
defendants).

